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Using a gravity model, we analyze the determinants of the probability that commercial banks in 89 ac- 
quiring countries and 118 target countries will undertake M&As over a 30-year period (1981–2010) and 
of the value of these M&As. We ﬁnd that the value of cross-border M&As increases with the size of the 
acquiring country, and that both the probability and value of M&As vary positively with the depth of the 
ﬁnancial market in acquirer countries and the presence of corporate and non-corporate customers from 
acquiring countries in target countries, and negatively with the geographic, psychic, and time zone dis- 
tances between acquirer and target countries. Our study highlights the role of non-corporate customers 
and of psychic distance in the cross-border expansion of commercial banks through M&As. 
© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
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July 2016 22. Introduction 
Which country-level factors lead banks to engage in cross-
order M&As? This question is gaining signiﬁcant attention from
esearchers (see, among others, Buch and DeLong, 2004; Focarelli
nd Pozzolo, 20 01, 20 08 , and Buch and Lipponer, 2007 as well
s Amel et al., 2004; Buch and DeLong, 2008 , and DeYoung
t al., 2009 for surveys). Their ﬁndings show that trade, a proxy
or the follow-the-corporate-customer motive ( Focarelli and Poz-
olo, 2001 ), geographic and cultural distances between acquirer
nd target countries ( Buch and DeLong, 2004; Buch et al., 2014 ),
nd country characteristics such as the market sizes of acquirer
nd target countries ( Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2008 ), lead banks to
ndertake cross-border M&As. 1 Still, “little is known why foreign∗ Corresponding author. Fax: + 31 13 466 2875. 
E-mail addresses: magn@iscte.pt , azzim.gulamhussen@vlerick.com (M.A. Gu- 
amhussen), j.f.hennart@uvt.nl (J.-F. Hennart), carlos.manuel.pinheiro@cgd.pt (C.M. 
inheiro). 
1 The literature on M&A activity is vast. One strand looks at ﬁrm-level factors 
hat lead banks to engage in M&A. These studies often control for acquirer and 
ost country factors. A major criticism to these studies is the diﬃculty to disentan- 
le bank and country–level factors that lead to M&A activity, since they include two 
ources of heterogeneity, country and bank, in the same speciﬁcation (e.g. Berger et 
l., 1999; Buch et al., 2013 ). Berger at al. (1999 ) is one the few studies that looks 
t the choice between M&A and greenﬁeld entry. Another strand of studies looks 
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378-4266/© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. anks enter some markets and not others, and how this relates
o home and host country factors, including bilateral aspects”
 Claessens and Van Horen, 2014a : 317). 
Figs. 1 and 2 track cross-border M&As between 89 acquiring
nd 118 target countries since the 1980s. Fig. 1 shows a steady
ncrease in the number of deals while Fig. 2 , which tracks their
alue, shows two merger waves in 1999–2001 and 2004–2008.
igs. 3 and 4 show that acquiring countries are also target coun-
ries for cross-border M&As, i.e. if banks from country i merge
ith or acquire banks in country j, then it is likely that banks from
ountry j will also merge with or acquire banks in country i. This
alls for the construction of country pairs over a wide time span
o study how the features of such pairs attract and deter cross-
order M&A. By focusing on country pairs, we avoid the potential
onfounding effects of simultaneously entering bank, country, and
ilateral characteristics, as has been done in previous studies. t the eﬃciency gains from M&A activity (e.g. DeLong, 20 01, 20 03; Cornett et al., 
003; Cornett et al., 2006; Correa, 2009 ). Again a major criticism to these studies 
s the diﬃculty to disentangle the stock market reaction to M&A activity and other 
rm and market–level factors. Along a similar line of reasoning, some studies look 
t the implications of M&As for lending, more often to small and medium enter- 
rises (e.g. Garmaise and Moskowitz, 2006; Craig and Hardee, 2007; Panetta et al., 
009 ), for deposit rates ( Craig and Dinger, 2009 ) or for both lending and deposit 
 Park and Pennacchi, 2009 ). 
 Fig. 1. Number of cross-border deals per year. 
Fig. 2. Volume of cross-border deals per year (million USD). 
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M.A. Gulamhussen et al. / Journal of Banking and Finance  7 2 (2016) S6–S18 S7Our study makes a number of contributions. First, we use
a gravity model to explain cross-border M&As between pairs of
countries. Gravity models have been used in similar settings, for
example to explain the level of credit to ﬁrms in country i pro-
vided by banks from country j and vice versa ( Brüggemann, 2012 )
and the number and level of assets held by banks of country i
in country j and vice versa ( Buch et al., 2013; Claessens and Van
Horen, 2014b ). Okawa and van Wincoop (2012) developed the the-
oretical foundations for the application of the gravity framework to
cross-border ﬁnancial holdings. We follow this novel literature and
apply this framework to analyze country pairs involved in cross-
border M&As over the past 30 years. Second, to the best of ournowledge, we are the ﬁrst to consider the role of non-corporate
ustomers and psychic distance on the cross-border expansion of
ommercial banks through M&As and to include comprehensive
easures of these pulling factors or economic masses in the grav-
ty framework. Our ﬁndings on the negative inﬂuence of geograph-
cal distance on cross-border M&As, and on the positive one of the
evel of banking development in the acquirer country, are consis-
ent with previous studies. Like them we also ﬁnd that bilateral
rade, as a proxy for follow-the-corporate-customer motives, has a
ositive effect on the number and value of cross-border M&As. To
he best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to hypothesize and ﬁnd
hat the larger the number of home country migrants into a tar-
Fig. 3. Number of deals per country pair. 
Note: for readability, only country pairs with more than one deal are represented. 
Fig. 4. Volume of deals (million USD) per country pair. 
Note: for readability, only country pairs with more than one deal are represented. 
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where their retail customers have located. 
2 According to OECD (1993) , there were 50,0 0 0 Portuguese immigrants in France 
in 1962 and six years later they were 30 0,0 0 0. By 1975, 80 0,0 0 0 Portuguese had 
settled there. A Ukrainian bank has recently opened a subsidiary in Portugal to 
serve the growing Ukrainian immigrant community. 
3 www.cgd-publishing.com/caixaempresas/marco2012/pdf . 
M.A. Gulamhussen et al. / Journal of Banking and Finance  7 2 (2016) S6–S18 S9get country, the more likely that home country banks will acquire
and merge with banks in that target country. Lastly, we are also
the ﬁrst, as far as we know, to enter a comprehensive measure of
psychic distance, a proxy for religious, linguistic and other differ-
ences between acquirer and target countries, as an explanation of
cross-border M&As. Zhu and Yang (2008) have argued that psy-
chic distance has been rarely used in ﬁnancial studies, although it
features in a large number of studies on ﬁrm internationalization
( Grady and Lane, 1996 ). 
We start by reviewing the motives for cross-border M&As. In
Section 3 we describe our data, methods and variables. We present
our ﬁndings in Section 4 , and our conclusions in Section 5 . 
2. Motives for cross-border M&AS in banking 
Results of past studies indicate that both acquirer and target
country characteristics lead banks to undertake M&As. A distinctive
feature of our study is that acquirer countries are also target coun-
tries. This feature of our data allows us to look at country pairs,
which in turn makes the gravity framework most appropriate. 
Gravity models are a convenient and succinct way to model all
the factors that both push banks towards, and restrain them from,
cross-border M&As. Gravity models have been successfully used to
explain international trade and investment ﬂows ( Tinbergen, 1962;
Leamer and Levinsohn, 1995; Okawa and van Wincoop, 2012 ). The
law of gravity states that the attraction between two objects is
proportional to their mass and inversely proportional to their dis-
tance. By analogy, economic transactions between two countries,
for example the number and volume of M&As by banks in country
i with banks in country j, should depend on (i) the characteris-
tics of the acquiring country, such as its size and level of devel-
opment; (ii) business opportunities in the target country, and (ii)
the costs of overcoming the frictions between the acquiring and
the target country. Distance, whether geographic or psychic, gener-
ates costs of managing remote activities that lower their proﬁtabil-
ity and hence reduce M&A activity. Regulatory barriers imposed by
target countries on the entry of foreign banks should also reduce
M&A ﬂows. 
M&As are a very common form through which banks based in
a country expand into another ( Buch and DeLong, 2004 ). There
are a number of potential reasons why banks may want to merge
with or acquire banks based in foreign countries. The ﬁrst motive
is common to manufacturing and other service ﬁrms expanding
abroad. In the course of their business, ﬁrms accumulate some in-
tangibles, such as new products and processes. These intangibles
are often public goods, insofar as they can be used in one ad-
ditional country without diminishing the amount available in all
other countries where they are already in use. This makes it poten-
tially proﬁtable to exploit those intangibles in other countries. This
is the rationale used to explain why research-and-development
intensive manufacturing ﬁrms have expanded abroad ( Hennart,
1982 ). In banking, experience with advanced back-oﬃce proce-
dures, the development of new products and business models, and
new commercialization and distribution technologies are intangi-
bles that can be transferred from one country to another ( Williams,
1997 ). Spanish banks, for example, have introduced new products
(such as lottery-linked deposit accounts) in their South American
subsidiaries, and new distribution methods, such as mini-branches
in gasoline stations, supermarkets, and other non-traditional loca-
tions ( Guillen and Tschoegl, 20 0 0 ). Banks based in countries where
banking is highly competitive and advanced have accumulated
such intangibles, and can hence be expected to expand abroad to
exploit them ( Tschoegl, 2004 ). They are likely to take over banks in
countries where banking is relatively less advanced but where the
size of the market (the economic mass in a gravity model) is suf-ciently large to provide beneﬁts over the costs of entering these
ountries ( Tschoegl, 1987 ). 
Hypothesis 1a. Banks based in countries with highly developed
banking are likely to engage in cross-border M&As. 
Hypothesis 1b. Banks based in countries with highly developed
banking are likely to engage in cross-border M&As in countries
where the size of the market is suﬃciently large to provide ben-
eﬁts over the costs of entering them . 
The second reason why banks based in one country may want
o engage in cross border M&As derives from the ﬁrst reason:
ecause of the gains from transferring intangibles between bank
gencies, the optimal scale of banking may be quite large relative
o the size of the home country ( Berger et al., 1993; Hughes and
ester, 2011 ). As a result, banking is highly concentrated in most
ational markets ( Bergstresser, 2008 ). For ﬁrms that are already
ominant in their home market, entering foreign markets may be
he only way to grow ( Vrontis and Sharp, 2003 ). This suggests that
anks located in markets where banking activities are highly de-
eloped will take over or merge with banks located in countries
hich are less developed but have growth potential. 
Hypothesis 1c. Banks based in highly concentrated markets will en-
gage in cross-border M&As. 
The third reason why banks located in one country may want to
ake over banks located in another country has to do with a differ-
nt type of intangibles. In the conduct of their domestic business,
anks get to know their customers and establish trusting relation-
hips with them. These relationships can then be leveraged when
ome-country commercial customers develop activities in foreign
arkets, or when home-country retail customers settle in foreign
ountries. This motive has been dubbed ‘follow your customer’. It
xplains why banks establish operations to offer banking services
n the foreign locations where their commercial customers have
anufacturing or service subsidiaries (e.g. Focarelli and Pozzolo,
001 ). 
Hypothesis 1d. Banks are likely to engage in M&As in countries
where their commercial customers have located. 
Follow the customer motives may also explain why banks may
stablish retail facilities in foreign locations where there is a con-
entration of nationals from their own country ( Esperanca and
ulamhussen, 2001 ). Hence Portuguese banks established in the
970s retail subsidiaries in Paris to serve the needs of Portuguese
aids and butlers who had taken employment there and were
ager to send money back to their families in Portugal ( Pellerin,
009; OECD, 1993 ). 2 In 2001, Caixa Geral de Depositos acquired the
anque Franco-Portugaise with the explicit goal to increase its net-
ork of agencies to serve this population. 3 Tschoegl (2005) notes
hat Japanese banks entered California early in the 20th century
nd again in the 1970s to serve the banking needs of Japanese em-
grants. Similar motives are behind the foreign expansion of Singa-
ore banks ( Tschoegl, 2002 ). One would therefore expect the total
evel of banking M&As from country i to country j to also be a
unction of the number of country i residents living in country j. 
Hypothesis 1e. Banks are likely to engage in M&As in countries
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M.A. Gulamhussen et al. / Journal of Banking and Finance  7 2 (2016) S6–S18 S10In spite of all the advantages to merging or acquiring foreign
anks, researchers have noted that the level of international M&A
ctivity in banking is much lower than that observed in other
ervice industries such as insurance ( Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2008 ).
ikewise, the level of international M&As in banking is proportion-
lly much lower than that of domestic M&As ( Caiazza et al., 2011 ),
hich suggests that there are high barriers to international expan-
ion. Since there are no major differences in the type of banks tar-
eted in domestic and international M&As, target country charac-
eristics would seem to be the main determinants of M&A activity
 Caiazza et al., 2012 ). 
Banking is an information intensive industry. Successful lend-
ng, especially to smaller ﬁrms, requires a subtle understanding
f their prospects and of their risk proﬁle ( Focarelli and Poz-
olo, 2001 ). Obtaining this qualitative and often tacit information
s diﬃcult if lenders are distant from borrowers ( Claessens and
an Horen, 2014b ). Thus the farther away two countries are, the
maller should be the level of M&A activity between them ( Buch
nd DeLong, 2004 ). One can think of three dimensions of distance.
ne of them is geographic distance. Differences in the broader in-
titutional environment (in language, religion, per capita income,
evels of education, and political systems) may also make it diﬃ-
ult to do banking outside one’s own country, and countries that
o not share common institutional frameworks are less likely to be
inked by M&A activity as bank managers are less likely to expand
n countries perceived to be dissimilar ( Ellis, 2008 ). Time zone dif-
erences may also complicate the monitoring of foreign banking
ubsidiaries since they impede communication with HQ. 
H 2a, b, c. The level of bank M&As between two countries will be
inversely proportional to the geographic (a), psychic (b) and time
zone (c) distances between them. 
A particular feature of banking is the high level of regula-
ion. Host country regulatory agencies have therefore considerable
pportunity to create additional barriers to the entry of foreign
anks, and to make their life diﬃcult after entry ( Focarelli and Poz-
olo, 2001 ). 
H 2d. Banks are less likely to engage in M&As in countries which
impose restrictions on foreign bank entry. 
. Data, method and variables 
.1. Data 
We obtained data on the yearly number and value of bank-
ng M&As from the SDC Platinum database published by Thomson
euters. We focus on international M&As that took place between
980 and 2010 in which a commercial bank is either an acquirer or
 target (there are no reliable data before 1980). We selected deals
ith a ﬁnal stake of more than 50% (i.e. a majority stake). We ex-
luded minority stakes, self-tenders, repurchases, and exchange of-
ers, because they tend to be driven by different motives and their
nclusion would introduce noise. We also excluded deals involving
ommercial banks located in offshores such as Aruba, Bermuda, the
ayman Islands, Guernsey, the Isle of Man and Mauritius, as the
otivation to undertake activities in offshore centers is quite dis-
inct from that in on-shore markets. 
Our units of observation are the number and value of M&As
f banks in country j by banks in country i in year t. We match
he 89 acquiring countries to the 118 target countries to construct
ountry pairs for each year between 1981 and 2010. Fig. 1 shows
he number of M&A deals in our sample and Fig. 2 their value be-
ween 1981 and 2010. Figs. 3 and 4 show the number and value of
eals by country pairs. Fig. 3 shows that the South Africa-United
ingdom and United States-Canada pairs account for the largestumber of deals (17 and 16, respectively), while Fig. 4 shows that
he highest value of deals (more than 20 billion USD) was between
he United Kingdom and the United States. Fig. 3 shows that there
s no correlation between the number of deals between acquirer-
arget and target-acquirer country pairs, while Fig. 4 shows that
his is also true for their value. Our sample also shows that U.S.
anks made the largest number of acquisitions (248) with the
ighest value (74 billion USD) and that the US was also the largest
arget country, with 298 deals worth 131 billion USD. Missing data
educed our sample to 2157 deals corresponding to 1724 country
airs and a volume of deals in excess of 525 billion USD. 
.2. Method 
Our dependent variables are whether country pairs have bank
&As between them, and their value. These dependent variables
re best explained in terms of a gravity model by which the occur-
ence and volume of M&As between pairs of countries are directly
roportional to their economic masses and the gravitational con-
tant G , and inversely proportional to the square of distance sepa-
ating them. The closed form of a standard gravity model is: 
F ij = G ∗
(
M i ∗ M j 
)
/ D ij 
2 (1) 
here F ij is the attraction force between two bodies, i and j, M
s the mass of the two bodies, i and j, D is the distance between
odies, i and j, and G is a constant. The application of Eq. (1) to
ilateral economic ﬂows uses GDP as a measure for the size of the
arket. So Eq. (1) applied to economic ﬂows becomes: 
ILATERAL ECONOMIC FLOW S i , j , t 
= 
(
GD P i , t + GD P j , t 
)
/ 
(
DISTANC E ij 
)2 
(2) 
Eq. (2) is a contained expression revealing that bilateral ﬂows
 F ij ) are an increasing function of the combined GDP (economic
ass) of countries i and j but a rapidly decreasing function of the
istance between country i and j. In other words, bilateral eco-
omic ﬂows will be signiﬁcant if the product of the masses is high
nd the countries are close. 
The usual way to run gravity models is to apply a logarithmic
ransformation to the right hand side of Eq. (2) . By estimating the
quation in logs, we obtain the following: 
&A s i , j , t = α + βk log MARKET POTENTIA L i , j , t + γk DISTANCE i , j , t 
+ σk CONTROLS i , j , t + a t + u i , j , t (3) 
here M&As are M&A deals where country i is the acquirer and
ountry j is the target and t is the year (from 1980 to 2010). Our
ndependent variables include estimates of the market sizes of the
cquirer country i and target country j, which in the latter case
s measured by the expected growth of that country, and by the
resence of corporate and non-corporate customers from the ac-
uiring country i present in target country j. The presence of cor-
orate customers is proxied by the trade volume between the two
ountries while opportunities for retail banking business are prox-
ed by the number of citizens of country i present in country j;
ISTANCE is measured by the geographic and psychic distances be-
ween acquiring country i and target country j, including the time
one differences between country i and country j, and differences
etween country i and country j in economic freedom. The time
ffect is represented by a t and the error term is represented by
 ij,t, which we can decompose in a ﬁxed or in a random effect μij 
nd a residual error term ε ij,t . In Table 1 , we describe our variables
nd their sources. 
 Table 1 
Variables and sources. 
Variables Description Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. Units Source 
Dependent variables 
NUMBER number of cross-border M&As 0.137 0 47 number Thomson Reuters (SDC Platinum) 
1.083 
VALUE volume of cross-border M&As 1406.568 0 9459.380 million USD Thomson Reuters (SDC Platinum) 
3774.267 
Independent variables 
Market sizes 
LOG SIZE (acquirer) log of the GDP of the acquirer 
country as a measure of its 
economic size. 
8.676 
1.456 
5.319 11.678 log (million USD) S&P, Global Stock Markets Factbook 
LOG FINANCIAL DEPTH 
(acquirer) 
log of the sum of market 
capitalization and private credit of 
the target country, both scaled to 
GDP, as a measure of the overall 
size of the ﬁnancial sector; before 
applying the log we add one to 
the previous sum to obtain 
positive values 
4.465 
0.810 
2.230 6.286 log (million USD) IMF, International Financial 
Statistics and data ﬁles, and 
World Bank and OECD estimates 
CONCENTRATION - HHI 
(acquirer) 
Herﬁndhal–Hirschman index (HHI) 
of concentration computed as the 
sum of the squared market shares 
of the acquiring country’s banks; 
a value of one denotes monopoly. 
0.518 
0.338 
0 1 ratio Beck et al. (2001) – The ﬁnancial 
structure database 
LOG UNEXPLORED MARKET 
(target) 
log of the difference between the 
ﬁnancial depth of the target 
country and that of the U.S. 
29.193 
3.736 
0 30.318 log (million USD) IMF, International Financial 
Statistics and data ﬁles, and 
World Bank and OECD estimates 
LOG GDP GROWTH (target) log of the GDP annual growth in the 
target country computed as the 
ﬁrst differences of a normalized 
series 
3.787 
1.075 
−0.800 6.270 number IMF, International Financial 
Statistics and data ﬁles, and 
World Bank and OECD estimates 
LOG GDP RESIDUAL (target) log of the residual error, computed 
as the difference between the 
actual GDP in the target country 
and its estimated value by a 
linear regression of the 
normalized GDP series from 1976 
to 2009 
3.161 
1.044 
−2.117 5.896 number IMF, International Financial 
Statistics and data ﬁles, and 
World Bank and OECD estimates 
LOG BILATERAL TRADE log of bilateral trade between 
acquirer and target countries, 
adding one unit to the effective 
value before computing the log 
1.968 
1.209 
0.0 0 0 5.771 number IMF, International Financial 
Statistics Database, Direction of 
Trade Statistics 
( www2.imfstatistics.org/DOT/ ) 
LOG MIGRANTS log of the number of people born in 
the acquirer country i that live in 
the target country; we add one 
unit to the effective value before 
computing the log 
1.874 
1.794 
0.0 0 0 7.066 log (thousands) Ratha and Shaw (2007) , Migrants 
and Remittances Factbook 2011, 
the Word Bank 
Distances 
LOG GEOGRAPHIC DISTANCE log of the geographic distance 
between acquirer and target 
countries; we add one unit to the 
effective value before computing 
the log 
3.808 
0.362 
2.260 4.296 number CEPII ( www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/ 
bdd/distances.htm ) 
PSYCHIC DISTANCE perceived degree of similarities in 
the characteristics of pairs of 
countries 
−0.202 
1.195 
−4.346 0.526 number Douglas Dow 
(sites.google.com/site/ddowresearch/) 
TIME ZONE time difference between acquirer 
and target countries, in absolute 
value 
0.473 
0.832 
0 18 integer ( http://time-zone.tripod.com/ 
timezones2.htm ) 
REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS limitations on foreign bank 
entry/ownership; measures the 
extent to which foreign banks are 
allowed to enter the target 
country 
3.798 
6.339 
1 4 number World Banks surveys on bank 
regulation by Barth, R. Caprio, G. 
& Levine, R. 
( www.worldbank.org ) 
( continued on next page ) 
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Table 1 ( continued ) 
Variables Description Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. Units Source 
Controls 
FINANCIAL OPENNESS country de jure degree of capital 
account openness, based on 
dummy variables that codify the 
tabulation of restrictions on 
cross-border ﬁnancial transactions 
0.210 
1.571 
−1.889 2.390 number Chinn-Ito index ( Chinn and Ito, 
2006 ) 
DIFFERENCES IN ECONOMIC 
FREEDOM 
difference between acquirer and 
target countries in the average 
score based on 10 measures of 
economic openness, regulatory 
eﬃciency and rule of law 
−0.307 
0.009 
−0.369 −0.301 number The Heritage Foundation 
( http://www.heritage.org/Index/ ) 
COMPETITIVENESS overall competitiveness, as a proxy 
for the attractiveness of the target 
country, measured by the IMD 
index 
60.883 
21.415 
0 100 number IMD Index - International Institute 
for Management Development 
( www.imd.org/research/centers/ 
wcc/index.cfm ) 
3
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.3.1. Dependent variables 
Our dependent variables are whether or not country pairs have
ompleted M&A deals, and their value. 
.3.2. Independent variables 
.3.2.1. Market size. According to the gravity model, the occurrence
f cross-border M&As and their value should depend on the size
f the acquiring country. Along with Claessens and Van Horen
2014b) , we measure that size, LOG SIZE (acquirer), by the log of
ts GDP. Hypothesis 1a states that the greater the level of intan-
ibles held by the banks of a focal country, the more likely they
ill engage in cross-border M&As. Along with Focarelli and Pozzolo
2008) , we assume that these intangibles are proportional to the
nancial depth of the acquiring country, LOG FINANCIAL DEPTH
acquirer), which is the log of a country’s sum of the stock mar-
et capitalization and credit to the private sector, both scaled by
ts GDP. Stock market capitalization is measured by the number of
utstanding shares of listed companies on the stock market multi-
lied by their share price, and credit to the private sector (hence-
orth private credit) is the ﬁnancing to the economy by both bank
nd non-bank intermediaries. 
We used three measures to test Hypothesis 1b which states that
he number and volume of M&As received by a target country will
e a function of the size of its market. LOG UNEXPLORED MARKET
target) measures market opportunities in the target country. We
omputed this variable as the log of the difference between the
nancial depth of the target country (as deﬁned earlier) and that
f the world’s most developed banking market, the U.S. We col-
ected data for this variable from the IMF, the OECD and the World
ank. We would also expect banks to be attracted to rapidly grow-
ng countries. Following Focarelli and Pozzolo (2006) we entered
he annual GDP growth in the target country, LOG GDP GROWTH .
e computed the annual growth for target country j as: 
DP GROWTH j , t = 
(
GDP j , t − GDP j , t −1 
)
/ GDP j , t −1 (4) 
We normalized annual growth by dividing GDP by the GDP of
he ﬁrst year of the period that then takes the value 100. We chose
976 as the base year (GDP = 100). GDP growth is then computed
s the ﬁrst differences of the normalized GDP series ( Kogut, 1991;
nderson, 1979 ). Our measure of annual growth of the target coun-
ry becomes: 
OGGDP GROWTH j , t = LOG 
(
GD P j , t − GD P j , t −1 
)
(5) Lastly, it is possible that banks are deterred by unstable condi-
ions and seek markets with stable growth ( Clare et al., 2012 ). We
herefore enter a measure of the variation of the target market GDP
rowth, LOG GDP RESIDUAL (target). We calculated the residual er-
or (GDP RESIDUAL) from a linear regression of the time trend of
DP over our period of analysis, where we estimate the slope (a)
nd the intercept (b). The residual error is the difference between
he real GDP for a particular country j and the ﬁtted GDP line de-
ived from the linear regression, for a particular year t. We used
he normalized GDP series to compute the residual error and log
he result ( Kogut, 1991; Anderson, 1979 ). The closed form is: 
OG R j , t = LOG [ GDP j , t − ( a j + b j ∗ t )] (6) 
Hypothesis 1c states that banks operating in concentrated mar-
ets are more likely to make foreign M&As because they are faced
ith limited domestic opportunities. We measure banking concen-
ration in the acquiring country by its Herﬁndhal–Hirschman con-
entration indices, CONCENTRATION HHI, computed by Beck et al.
2001) . This variable is the sum of the squared market shares of
he acquiring country’s banks. It ranges from its lowest value (the
eciprocal of the number of banks in an economy when all are of
he same size) to one in the case of monopoly. 
Following Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001) , the market potential to
anks from the acquiring country from serving their home-country
orporate customers in the target country (Hypothesis 1d) is prox-
ed by the level of bilateral trade between acquirer and target
ountries, LOG BILATERAL TRADE. The higher the level of trade be-
ween two countries, the greater the probability that commercial
ustomers of the home-country bank will be present in the target
ountry ( Buch and DeLong, 2004 ). We measure this variable as the
og of the total value of trade (the sum of imports and exports)
etween the acquiring and the target country. Data were collected
rom the IMF ( www2.imfstatistics.org/DOT /). 
We use the variable LOG MIGRANTS to test Hypothesis 1e. This
ariable measures the market potential to acquiring country banks
f serving non-corporate customers from their own country that
eside in the target country ( Esperanca and Gulamhussen, 2001 ). It
s measured by the log of the number of persons born in country i
ho are living in country j without being permanent residents of
hat country. Data was obtained from Ratha and Shaw (2007) and
he Word Bank ( www.data.worldbank.org ). 
.3.2.2. Distances. We use three measures of distance to test Hy-
otheses 2a, 2b and 2c. LOG GEOGRAPHIC DISTANCE measures
he cost of managing activities in distant geographic locations
 Buch and DeLong, 2004; Martin and Rey, 20 04; Giovanni, 20 05 ).
 Table 2 
Correlation matrix. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 NUMBER OF DEALS 1 
2 VALUE OF DEALS 0.827 1 
3 LOG SIZE (acquirer) 0.066 0.052 1 
4 LOG FINANCIAL DEPTH 
(acquirer) 
0.096 0.073 0.637 1 
5 CONCENTRATION 
(acquirer) 
0.011 0.008 0.228 0.094 1 
6 LOG UNEXPLORED 
MARKET (target) 
−0.481 −0.452 −0.037 −0.066 0.094 1 
7 LOG GDP GROWTH 
(target) 
0.0 0 0 −0.003 0.127 0.111 0.105 0.067 1 
8 LOG GDP RESIDUAL 
(target) 
−0.039 −0.033 0.106 0.103 0.096 0.080 0.601 1 
9 LOG BILATERAL TRADE 0.296 0.219 0.231 0.297 0.081 −0.216 0.153 0.136 1 
10 LOG MIGRANTS 0.272 0.195 0.028 0.042 0.010 −0.184 −0.009 −0.130 0.599 1 
11 LOG GEOGRAPHIC 
DISTANCE 
−0.147 −0.096 0.020 −0.003 −0.057 −0.014 0.010 0.031 −0.347 −0.246 1 
12 PSYCHIC DISTANCE −0.170 −0.107 −0.074 −0.002 0.021 0.075 0.024 0.029 −0.102 −0.212 0.154 1 
13 TIME ZONE −0.065 −0.039 0.011 −0.069 0.019 −0.097 −0.069 0.002 0.025 0.030 −0.022 −0.016 1 
14 REGULATORY 
RESTRICTIONS (target) 
0.036 0.021 −0.016 −0.018 −0.020 −0.040 −0.094 −0.043 0.073 0.118 −0.057 0.041 −0.034 1 
15 FINANCIAL OPENNESS 
(target) 
0.096 0.074 0.085 0.047 0.109 −0.043 0.166 0.093 0.128 0.291 0.281 −0.061 −0.013 −0.169 1 
16 DIFFERENCES IN 
ECONOMIC FREEDOM 
−0.038 −0.036 −0.015 0.119 −0.030 −0.008 0.020 0.093 −0.011 −0.130 0.051 0.102 0.022 0.022 −0.074 1 
17 COMPETITIVENENESS 
(target) 
0.097 0.081 0.019 0.049 0.016 −0.123 0.076 −0.064 0.269 0.395 0.013 −0.046 −0.131 0.126 0.476 −0.007 
Numbers in bold denote signiﬁcance at the 1% level. 
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4 The negative binomial model is a generalization of the Poisson model. A key 
restriction of the Poisson distribution is that the variance equals the mean. Since 
unobserved heterogeneity can cause overdispersion of the data, the negative bino- 
mial model enters an unobserved effect in the conditional mean of the dependent 
variable to allow for overdispersion ( Wooldridge, 2010; Brakman et al., 2014 ). 
M.A. Gulamhussen et al. / Journal of Banking and Finance  7 2 (2016) S6–S18 S13We measure it by the log of the geographic distance between the
capitals of the acquiring and target countries. We collected data for
this variable from CEPII ( www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.
htm ). PSYCHIC DISTANCE is a comprehensive measure of the dis-
tance between acquiring country i and target country j in language,
religion, industrial development, levels of education, and political
systems. We downloaded the data for this variable from Douglas
Dow’s website ( https://sites.google.com/site/ddowresearch/ ), which
provides a complete description. TIME ZONE (difference between
acquirer and target) is the absolute time difference between ac-
quirer and target countries: the greater the time difference be-
tween acquirer and target, the more diﬃcult it will be for HQ to
communicate with its foreign acquisitions, and hence the less de-
sirable the country as a target for acquisitions. 
Lastly we entered REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS (target). This
variable measures whether foreign banks are permitted to enter
and own banks in the target country ( Barth et al., 2013 ). We col-
lected data for this variable from surveys of bank regulators and
supervisors conducted by the World Bank in 180 countries. For
instance, China and Indonesia impose foreign equity limits while
OECD countries have relatively fewer restrictions on foreign equity
ownership. We used the results of the 20 01, 20 03, 20 07 and 2012
surveys. 
3.4. Estimation 
Our data are censored at zero as there are several country pairs
for which the number and value of M&As are zero. A possible ap-
proach to estimate the gravity model might be two-step estima-
tion such as the Heckman selection model ( Heckman, 1979 ). Two-
step estimation procedures distinguish between the probability of
an M&A (ﬁrst step) and the value of M&A deals (second step), sim-
ilar to the distinction between extensive and intensive margins in
trade theory models ( Melitz, 2003; Helpman et al., 2007; Brak-
man et al., 2014 ). However two-step estimation requires an ad-
equate exclusion restriction for identiﬁcation of the second step,
which is sometimes diﬃcult. To avoid having to ﬁnd an appropri-te exclusion restriction – a variable inﬂuencing the probability of
oing an M&A (ﬁrst step) but not their value (second step) – we
ollow Lambert’s (1992) zero-inﬂated approach as in Brakman et
l. (2014) . This approach contemplates a combination of probabil-
ty distributions representing two processes: one zero-process in
hich only zeros are detected (i.e. Bernoulli), and a truncated pro-
ess (e.g. Poisson or negative binomial) in which zero and non-
ero values are observed ( Lambert, 1992 ). This succinct approach
s similar to a Heckman estimation procedure but is less restric-
ive and builds on two groups of observations: (i) observations that
ave a zero outcome with a probability 1, and (ii) observations
hat might be zero or non-zero. As in Brakman et al. (2014) we
stimate the probability of doing an M&A with a logit and model
he value of the M&A deals with a zero-inﬂated negative binomial
ZINB) speciﬁcation. The use of ZINB is recommended by Anderson
nd Wincoop (2003), Cameron and Trivedi (2009) and Anderson
2011) , and ZINB is used by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and
rakman et al. (2014) because it accommodates excess zeros and
ver-dispersion of the dependent variable, a phenomenon often
bserved in large counts. 4 We run the Vuong test of the zero-
nﬂated versus the standard model as suggested by Cameron and
rivedi (2009) . The signiﬁcant z-test conﬁrms that a zero-inﬂated
odel is a better ﬁt. Our speciﬁcations include country ﬁxed ef-
ects to account for unobserved country characteristics and year
xed effects to account for unobserved time-variant effects. 
The descriptive statistics of our data are in Table 1 , and the
airwise correlations between our variables in Table 2 . The correla-
ions are generally low, suggesting no linear dependence between
ur independent variables. 
Table 3 
Determinants of cross-border acquisitions in commercial banking. 
Dependent: Probability of M&As M&A Value Probability of M&As M&A Value Probability of M&As M&A Value 
Logit coeff. ZINB coeff. IRR Logit coeff. ZINB coeff. IRR Logit coeff. ZINB coeff. IRR 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Market sizes – acquirer 
LOG SIZE (acquirer) 0.070 0.151 ∗∗∗ 1.163 0.023 0.097 ∗∗ 1.102 0.023 0.106 ∗∗∗ 1.112 
(0.103) (0.036) (0.095) (0.038) (0.095) (0.038) 
LOG FINANCIAL DEPTH (acquirer) 0.379 ∗∗ 0.441 ∗∗∗ 1.555 0.377 ∗∗ 0.290 ∗∗∗ 1.336 0.376 ∗∗ 0.337 ∗∗∗ 1.401 
(0.193) (0.077) (0.187) (0.075) (0.187) (0.079) 
CONCENTRATION – HHI (acquirer) −0.257 0.022 −0.193 −0.304 ∗∗ 0.738 −0.193 −0.178 
(0.325) (0.137) (0.295) (0.135) (0.295) (0.144) 
Market sizes – target 
LOG UNEXPLORED MARKET (target) −0.042 ∗∗ −0.105 ∗∗∗ 0.900 −0.040 ∗ −0.094 ∗∗∗ 1.099 −0.040 ∗ −0.087 ∗∗∗ 0.917 
(0.021) (0.015) (0.022) (0.006) (0.022) (0.006) 
LOG GDP GROWTH (target) −0.034 −0.162 ∗∗ 0.850 −0.032 −0.127 −0.032 −0.148 ∗ 0.863 
(0.021) (0.082) (0.026) (0.077) (0.026) (0.088) 
LOG GDP RESIDUAL (target) 0.029 ∗ −0.058 0.025 −0.074 0.025 −0.082 
(0.015) (0.072) (0.017) (0.064) (0.017) (0.074) 
Market sizes – acquirer-target 
LOG BILATERAL TRADE 0.937 ∗∗∗ 1.612 ∗∗∗ 5.011 1.053 ∗∗∗ 1.135 ∗∗∗ 3.111 1.053 ∗∗∗ 1.272 ∗∗∗ 3.570 
(0.178) (0.057) (0.167) (0.059) (0.167) (0.064) 
LOG MIGRANTS 0.325 ∗∗∗ 0.696 ∗∗∗ 2.006 0.321 ∗∗∗ 0.507 ∗∗∗ 1.660 0.321 ∗∗∗ 0.549 ∗∗∗ 1.732 
(0.086) (0.031) (0.091) (0.031) (0.091) (0.030) 
Distances 
LOG GEOGRAPHIC DISTANCE −0.584 −0.605 ∗ 0.546 −0.362 −0.487 ∗∗∗ 0.615 −0.362 −0.535 ∗∗∗ 0.586 
(0.526) (0.344) (0.394) (0.128) (0.393) (0.149) 
LOG GEOGRAPHIC DISTANCE ∗ 0.002 −0.024 ∗ 0.976 
TIME TREND (0.012) (0.013) 
PSYCHIC DISTANCE −0.457 ∗∗∗ −0.506 ∗∗∗ 0.603 −0.485 ∗∗∗ −0.297 ∗∗∗ 0.743 −0.491 ∗∗∗ −0.442 ∗∗∗ 0.643 
(0.113) (0.028) (0.112) (0.070) (0.106) (0.029) 
PSYCHIC DISTANCE ∗ TIME TREND 0.0 0 0 −0.005 ∗ 0.995 
(0.002) (0.003) 
TIME ZONE −0.089 ∗∗ −0.446 ∗∗∗ 0.640 −0.074 ∗ −0.409 ∗∗∗ 0.664 −0.074 ∗ −0.400 ∗∗∗ 0.670 
(0.044) (0.015) (0.043) (0.015) (0.043) (0.014) 
REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS 0.108 −0.267 ∗ 0.766 
(0.096) (0.132) 
Intercept −5.343 ∗∗ 6.423 ∗∗∗ −6.633 ∗∗∗ 6.732 ∗∗∗ −6.634 ∗∗∗ 0.346 ∗∗∗
(2.101) (1.270) (1.962) (0.854) (1.362) (0.051) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 27,147 31,535 24,059 31,535 24,059 27,516 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively. 
IRR are the incidence rate ratios. We obtain the incidence rate ratio by exponentiating the correspondent ZINB regression coeﬃcient. IRR indicate the change in the value of 
M&As if a variable changes by one unit. 
IRR less than 1 implies a decrease in the rate ratio and more than 1 implies an increase in the rate ratio. The number of observations is less than the number of cases, as 
incomplete cases for some variables are excluded and some cases are dropped to avoid collinearity. 
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We present the estimation results of our baseline speciﬁcation
n Table 3 . Panels 1, 4, and 7 provide the estimates for the proba-
ility of a country pair having M&As, whilst Panels 2–3, 5–6, and
–9 display the estimates and the incidence rate ratios (IRR) for
he value of M&As. Panels 1–3 and 4–6 include the interaction
f our distance variables (GEOGRAPHIC DISTANCE and PSYCHIC
ISTANCE) with a time trend. In Panels 7–9 we enter the variable
EGULATORY RESTRICTIONS as an additional variable to measure
egulatory limits on the entry of foreign banks and on their own-
rship in the target country. 
We ﬁnd that the size of the acquirer’s home country is not a
rerequisite for M&As (LOG SIZE is not signiﬁcant in Panels 1, 4
nd 7 of Table 3 ) but the larger the size of the acquirer’s home
ountry, the larger the value of M&As (LOG SIZE is positive and
igniﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence level in Panels 2, 5 and 8). The
RRs show that an increase in one unit of LOG SIZE corresponds
o an increase above 1.1 of the volume of M&As, holding all other
ariables constant. In H1a and b we hypothesized that banks in
ountries with highly developed bank markets have accumulated
echnical, marketing, and managerial skills, which they can exploit
n target countries; hence these countries would be more likely tongage in cross-border M&As. As predicted, the coeﬃcient of LOG
INANCIAL DEPTH, which measures the maturity of ﬁnancial in-
titutions in the acquiring country, is positive and signiﬁcant at
he 5% conﬁdence level for the probability of having M&As and
t the 1% conﬁdence level for their value. Both coeﬃcients show
imilar economic signiﬁcance (the coeﬃcient estimates are only
lightly higher for the probability of M&As, 0.376–0.379, than for
heir value, 0.290–0.441). Focarelli and Pozzolo (2008) , who inves-
igated the factors inﬂuencing the number of cross-border M&As
n banking and insurance, also found this variable to be signif-
cant. One often argued motivation for foreign expansion is sat-
ration in the home market, and hence in H1c we argued that
anks in countries with high banking concentration would be more
ikely to engage in cross-border M&As. Our results are not sup-
ortive, since the coeﬃcient of CONCENTRATION-HHI, the concen-
ration ratio in the home banking market, is generally not signif-
cant (except in panel 5 where it takes the wrong sign). We had
lso hypothesized in H1d that banks engage in cross-border M&As
o leverage the relationships they have established with their do-
estic corporate customers. This implies that the level of banking
&As between two countries should be related to the volume of
rade between them. As predicted, LOG BILATERAL TRADE, the log
f the value of trade between a country pair, is positive and sig-
Table 4 
Robustness tests. 
Financial Openness (Chinn-Ito index) Differences in Economic Freedom Competitiveness (IMD index) 
Probability of M&As Value of M&As Probability of M&As Value of M&As Probability of M&As Value of M&As 
Logit coeff. ZINB coeff. IRR Logit coeff. ZINB coeff. IRR Logit coeff. ZINB coeff. IRR 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Market sizes – acquirer 
LOG SIZE (acquirer) 0.076 0.354 ∗∗∗ 1.425 0.087 0.077 0.115 0.441 ∗∗∗ 1.555 
(0.106) (0.041) (0.132) (0.066) (0.114) (0.052) 
LOG FINANCIAL DEPTH (acquirer) 0.340 ∗ 0.859 ∗∗∗ 2.360 0.292 0.178 0.305 0.546 ∗∗∗ 1.727 
(0.194 (0.084) (0.250) (0.112) (0.214) (0.103) 
CONCENTRATION – HHI 
(acquirer) 
−0.174 0.072 0.269 −0.339 ∗ 0.712 −0.744 ∗ 0.067 
(0.304) (0.156) (0.350) (0.176) (0.445) (0.232) 
Market sizes – target 
LOG UNEXPLORED MARKET 
(target) 
−0.044 ∗∗ −0.023 ∗∗∗ 0.978 −0.057 −0.056 ∗∗∗ 0.945 −0.038 ∗ −0.051 ∗∗∗ 0.950 
(0.020) (0.006) (0.027) (0.005) (0.022) (0.006) 
LOG GDP GROWTH (target) −0.028 −0.123 −0.018 −0.058 −0.062 −0.384 ∗∗ 0.685 
(0.021) (0.083) (0.024) (0.080) (0.044) (0.150) 
LOG GDP RESIDUAL (target) 0.023 0.104 0.009 −0.062 0.055 ∗ 0.334 ∗∗∗ 1.397 
(0.015) (0.075) (0.017) (0.074) (0.024) (0.116) 
Market sizes – acquirer-target 
LOG BILATERAL TRADE 0.943 ∗∗∗ 1.962 ∗∗∗ 7.115 1.006 ∗∗∗ 0.579 ∗∗∗ 1.784 0.903 ∗∗∗ 1.528 ∗∗∗ 4.608 
(0.182) (0.062) (0.226) (0.080) (0.217) (0.072) 
LOG MIGRANTS 0.316 ∗∗∗ 0.786 ∗∗∗ 2.194 0.308 ∗∗∗ 0.259 ∗∗∗ 1.296 0.364 ∗∗∗ 0.969 ∗∗∗ 2.635 
(0.086) (0.031) (0.113) (0.042) (0.123) (0.048) 
Distances 
LOG GEOGRAPHIC DISTANCE −0.547 −2.189 ∗∗∗ 0.112 −0.645 ∗∗∗ −0.278 ∗∗ 0.757 −0.296 ∗∗∗ −1.983 ∗∗∗ 0.137 
(0.403) (0.183) (0.514) (0.128) (0.393) (0.214) 
PSYCHIC DISTANCE −0.449 ∗∗∗ −0.596 ∗∗∗ 0.551 −0.333 −0.248 ∗∗∗ 0.780 −0.407 −0.668 ∗∗∗ 0.513 
(0.115) (0.025) (0.129) ∗∗ (0.033) (0.144) (0.037) 
TIME ZONE −0.095 ∗∗ −0.406 ∗∗∗ 0.666 −0.123 −0.271 ∗∗∗ 0.763 −0.104 ∗∗ −0.364 ∗∗∗ 0.695 
(0.044) (0.014) (0.053) (0.024) (0.052) (0.020) 
Controls 
FINANCIAL OPENNESS (target) 0.019 −0.099 ∗∗ 0.906 
(0.023) (0.045) (0.050) 
DIFFERENCES IN ECONOMIC 
FREEDOM 
−11.911 −0.849 
(3.024) (5.635) 
COMPETITIVENESS (target) −0.002 −0.003 
(0.001) (0.009) 
Intercept −5.117 ∗∗ −2.869 ∗∗∗ −7.998 7.248 ∗∗∗ −6.747 −1.234 
(1.973) (0.882) (4.943) (1.760) (2.331) (1.426) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 26,478 30,228 18,296 27,147 11,881 12,867 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗, respectively. 
IRR are the incidence rate ratios. We obtain the incidence rate ratio by exponentiating the correspondent ZINB regression coeﬃcient. IRR indicate the change in the value of 
M&As if a variable changes by one unit. IRR less than 1 implies a decrease in the rate ratio and more than 1 implies an increase in the rate ratio. 
The number of observations is less than the number of cases, as incomplete cases for some variables are excluded and some cases are dropped to avoid collinearity. 
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range from 3.1 to 5.0, the largest effect on M&As. Focarelli and
Pozzolo (2001) , in their study of cross-border bank M&As in OECD
countries, also used trade ﬂows to proxy for follow-the-corporate-
customer and obtained similar results. 5 LOG BILATERAL TRADE has
a weaker impact on the probability a country will engage in M&As
(0.937–1.053) than on their value (1.135–1.612). In H1e we hypoth-
esized that domestic banks may also merge and take over banks
in countries that host their nationals in order to provide them
with retail services. This implies that banks should engage in M&As
in countries where their retail customers are located. This is sup-
ported by our ﬁndings, since the sign of LOG MIGRANTS, which is
the log of the number of home country expatriates living in a tar-
get country, is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence level.
This variable has the second largest impact with an IRR that ranges
from 1.7 to 2.0. Its impact on the value of M&A deals (coeﬃcient
estimates range from 0.507 to 0.696) is greater than on their prob-
ability (coeﬃcient estimates range from 0.321 to 0.325). 
The gravity model suggests that the probability and the value of
bank M&As between pairs of countries should be negatively cor-5 Claessens and Van Horen (2013) document that trade and bank international- 
ization follow similar patterns. 
b  
t  
l  elated with the distance between them. The most obvious mea-
ure of distance is geographic distance. As in other studies (e.g.
uch and DeLong, 2004 ), we ﬁnd a negative and statistically sig-
iﬁcant relationship between our measure of geographic distance,
OG GEOGRAPHIC DISTANCE, and M&As. LOG GEOGRAPHIC DIS-
ANCE impacts more the value of M&As than their probability (co-
ﬃcient estimates are −0.362 to −0.584 for probability of hav-
ng M&As and −0.487 to −0.605 for their value). A one unit in-
rease in LOG GEOGRAPHIC DISTANCE more than halves the value
f M&As (IRR 0.546). While geographic distance is undeniably im-
ortant, the ability of banks of one country to make and man-
ge acquisitions in another country may also hinge on the simi-
arity of their overall environment. The more dissimilar the envi-
onment, the lower the level of information available to managers,
nd hence the higher the psychic distance between the countries.
he higher the psychic distance, the lower the probability to en-
age in M&As. As predicted, the coeﬃcient of PSYCHIC DISTANCE,
hich measures differences in language, religion, education, polit-
cal systems, and economic development, is negative and signiﬁ-
ant. Previous studies analyzing the determinants of cross-border
ank M&As (e.g. Buch and DeLong, 20 04, 20 08 ) have also found
hat some components of psychic distance, such as differences in
anguage and legal systems, discouraged M&As. Our results sug-
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f M&As as on their value (coeﬃcient estimates for both groups
ange from −0.297 to −0.506). Interestingly, psychic distance has
 greater impact than geographic distance on the value of M&As
the IRRs for PSYCHIC DISTANCE are higher than those for LOG GE-
GRAPHIC DISTANCE). We interact our distance variables (LOG GE-
GRAPHIC DISTANCE and PSYCHIC DISTANCE) with a time trend to
nalyze the changes of the effect of distance on the value of M&As
ver time. The distance-time trend interaction proxies for an in-
reased degree of market integration over our period of analysis
1981–2010). Our ﬁndings suggest that market integration is not a
rerequisite for M&As (the coeﬃcient estimates in panels 1 and 4
re not statistically signiﬁcant) and affects only the value of M&As
ut with a minor impact since the coeﬃcients in panels 2 and 5
re only signiﬁcant at the 10% conﬁdence level with an IRR be-
ow 1. 6 These ﬁndings differ from those of Brakman et al. (2014) ,
hich might be due to a different sample – we analyze bank-
ng and Brakman et al. (2014) conduct a cross-industry analysis –
nd a more recent period of analysis – 1981–2010 as compared to
896–2005. Time zone differences should also increase communi-
ation diﬃculties between acquirer and targets, and hence discour-
ge M&As. As predicted by H2c, the coeﬃcient of TIME ZONE, the
bsolute number of time zones between two countries, is signiﬁ-
antly negative (at the 5%–10% conﬁdence level for the probability
f M&As and at 1% for their value). This is consistent with Stein
nd Daude (2007) , who found that differences in time zones had a
igniﬁcant negative effect on trade and foreign direct investment.
ne would also expect the number of M&As to be lower in target
ountries that restrict foreign investment in banking. As predicted
y H2d, REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS, our variable which measures
he extent to which foreign banks are allowed to enter the target
arket, has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant impact on the
alue of M&A deals with an IRR at 0.8. 
Surprisingly our variables that measure target market opportu-
ities are not signiﬁcant or take the wrong sign. Our measure of
he market potential of target countries, LOG UNEXPLORED MAR-
ET, which is the difference between the ﬁnancial depth of the tar-
et market and that of the United Sates, is signiﬁcant but takes
 negative sign, which is contrary to our expectations. We had
hought that banks would be attracted to growing markets, but
ur measure of the rate of growth of the target market, LOG GDP
ROWTH, is signiﬁcantly negative. Lastly, more stable target coun-
ries do not seem to attract more cross-border acquisitions, as the
oeﬃcient of LOG GDP RESIDUAL is statistically insigniﬁcant, ex-
ept in Panel 1 for the probability of M&As. 
.1. Robustness tests 
We perform ﬁve robustness tests to control for several institu-
ional differences between acquirer and target countries (see also
erger et al., 2004 ). In these tests we assess the inﬂuence of vari-
bles that have been found signiﬁcant in past studies and have
heoretical justiﬁcations for potentially inﬂuencing the dependent
ariable ( Okawa and van Wincoop, 2012 ). First, in Table 4 , pan-
ls 1–3 (probability and value of deals), we add a control for de
ure FINANCIAL OPENNESS, since M&As rely on international capi-6 Brambor et al. (2006) suggest that interaction terms should be included in the 
egressions when they pertain to conditional hypotheses. Our hypotheses that the 
mount of M&As by banks of one country into another are affected by geographical 
nd psychic distances are not conditional on TIME TREND. As TIME TREND is not 
 modifying variable we do not enter it in the runs and so avoid collinearity with 
ime ﬁxed effects. We enter TIME TREND to explore the possibility that increased 
ntegration might have reduced the impact of geographical distance and psychic 
istance on M&As. As it happens, the statistical and economical signiﬁcance of GE- 
GRAPHIC DISTANCE and PSYCHIC DISTANCE are not considerably affected when 
e enter the interaction of these variables with TIME TREND. 
a  
a  
i  
c  
q  
h  
w  
s  
p  
sal ﬂows ( Brakman et al., 2014 ). This variable is measured by the
hinn-Ito index initially introduced by Chinn and Ito (2006) and
ow updated as of the end of 2013 to capture a country’s degree
f capital account openness. FINANCIAL OPENNESS has no statis-
ically signiﬁcant impact on the probability of making an M&A,
uggesting that it is not a prerequisite for M&As, but is signiﬁ-
ant at the 5% conﬁdence level for the value of M&As. However,
he IRR for this variable (0.906) is relatively low. Second, in Pan-
ls 4–6, we add a control for DIFFERENCES IN ECONOMIC FREE-
OM between target and acquirer countries, as calculated by the
eritage Foundation. This variable measures differences between
cquirer and target countries in freedom of doing business, level
f economic openness, regulatory eﬃciency, and rule of law. Our
esults are conﬁrmed. Third, in Panels 7–9, we control for the de-
ree of COMPETITIVENESS of the target country using the compet-
tiveness score assigned by the IMD World Competitiveness Center.
gain, this does not change our results. Fourth, in unreported ﬁnd-
ngs, we exclude the countries that are responsible for the largest
umber and value of deals. i.e. the U.S., U.K. and France. Our pre-
ious results are again conﬁrmed. Fifth, we divide the sample in
our sub-periods that reﬂect the four merger waves suggested in
ig. 1 – 1981–1991, 1992–20 0 0, 20 01–20 04, and 20 05–2010. We
re interested in changes over time of M&As determinants. Since
conomic and ﬁnancial integration has been increasing over time,
e expect the distance variables to become less important. Our re-
ults, available upon request, suggest that increased economic in-
egration has markedly reduced the effect of both geographic and
sychic distances from 1992 onwards. 
. Conclusions 
The large increase in cross-border M&As in banking over the
ast three decades and the recent contraction in international
anking networks have attracted considerable scholarly attention
 Minoiu and Reyes, 2013 ). Our paper focuses on country level de-
erminants of M&As in banking. In contrast to past studies that
ave looked at a single or a small group of acquiring and target
ountries, we collected data on the M&As made by banks in 89 ac-
uiring countries into 118 target countries over a 30 year period
1981–2010). We use a gravity framework to predict the determi-
ants of the probability of country pairs having bank M&As and of
heir value. Gravity models have been extensively used to model
nternational trade ﬂows (e.g. Anderson, 2011 ) and more recently
oreign direct investments (e.g. Hejazi, 2007 ), including those in
anking ( Claessens and Van Horen, 2014b ). 
We test a number of hypotheses on the factors that motivate
nd restrain cross-border M&As. Some of them receive empirical
upport. Consistent with transaction costs and internalization the-
ries (e.g. Hennart, 1982 ), we ﬁnd that banks make cross-border
&As to exploit their ﬁrm-speciﬁc advantages. They also estab-
ish a foreign presence through the acquisition of foreign banks to
aintain relationships with domestic market customers present in
he target country, as failure to serve them in that country may
ead their customers to switch to local banks and to ultimately
hreaten the domestic banking relationship ( Clare et al., 2013 ). We
lso ﬁnd support for the novel hypothesis that banks make foreign
cquisitions to serve their domestic retail customers who have em-
grated to foreign countries. We hypothesize that banks based in
ountries where banking is highly concentrated make foreign ac-
uisitions to escape limitations to domestic growth, but this novel
ypothesis does not receive empirical support. We introduce a new
ay of measuring the degree to which target markets are under-
erved by the existing banking system, but this measure does not
erform well. Another unexpected ﬁnding is that banks do not
eem to target potential high growth countries. 
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tant studies, that M&As are deterred by geographical distance.
While the literature has also used non-geographic measures of dis-
tance, such as dummies for common language and legal tradition,
we use a more comprehensive measure of psychic distance (which
for example acknowledges that in some countries a substantial
part of the population may speak a language common with other
countries) and ﬁnd it to be a signiﬁcant deterrent to foreign bank-
ing M&As. We also look at the impact of time zone differences and
ﬁnd it has a similar effect. Lastly we control with a time-variant
measure of target country regulatory barriers to bank entry. 
Our paper suggests avenues for further research. First, for rea-
sons of data availability, we focus on M&As, which is the most
common form of foreign market entry in banking ( Eppendorfer,
2002 ). Researchers may want to test whether our model also ap-
plies to foreign entry through greenﬁelds. Researchers might also
want to focus at what makes countries attractive to foreign bank
entrants and improve on our measure of under-served markets.
The impact of domestic banking structure on cross-border M&As
would also seem to deserve further study. Lastly, while much of
the extant literature has focused on new entries, the recent bank-
ing crisis might offer interesting opportunities in studying banking
exits. Which factors explain disinvestments from foreign markets,
and are they the same as those that have been found to determine
entry? 
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